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POLICY PREFERENCES OF POLITICAL
PARTY LEADERS AND THE MASS PUBLIC:
A SOUTHERN PERSPECTIVE
M ark C. Ellickson

(Southwest Missouri State University)
Introduction and Literature
In recent years there has been a steady stream of literature proclaim
ing the decline of the American party system (Burnham, 1976; Kirkpa
trick, 1978; Ladd, 1982; Crotty, 1984, 1985; Konda and Sigelman,
1987). It is argued that the parties have been losing their “ relevance,”
their critical capacity in responding to social needs and problems
(Eldersveld, 1982; Miller and Wattenberg, 1983). This allegation entails
serious ramifications as political parties have long been viewed as
performing many vital functions in the American political system
(Leiserson, 1958; Sorauf, 1984).
Concern about party decline seems to have rejuvenated the topic of
party reform (Everson, 1980: Sabato, 1988). A major thrust of the reform
controversy has centered around the type of party system we should
move toward in order to make the parties more effective institutions.
One such model which has evoked a fair amount of advocacy, as well as
opposition, over the years is what has become known as the ‘‘responsible
parties” model (Ranney, 1962; Everson, 1980).
A party from the “ responsible parties” school of thought is usually
depicted as centralized, ideological, and disciplined, while the typical
textbook treatment of the American party system describes it as decentral
ized, pragmatic, and undisciplined. In a much improved conceptualiza
tion of the alternative party models, Hidin and Jackson (1979) suggest
that political parties may vary along continuums with respect to three
dimensions.
These dimensions are:
1. more national centralized party organizational structures;
2. more issue and ideological coherence within the parties and greater
distinctions between the parties, particularly in the electoral
appeals they make; and
3. the vesting of some sort of party discipline in a central party body,
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panics as political entities, and suggested a bidimensional conceptualiza
tion of partisan identification that consisted of a partisan/non-partisan
(i.e., independent) dimension and a Democratic/Republican (partisan)
dimension.
Valentine and Van Wingen [1980], who present evidence that
independent-leaners are attached to both one of the political parties and
to the idea of independence, also conclude that partisan identification
ought to be considered bidimensional. Weisberg [1980] has combined
the Katz and Valentine-Van Wingen conceptualizations with the hostility
hypothesis of Maggiotto and Piereson into a multi-dimensional, cubic
model of partisan identification that simultaneously measures subjects’
affect toward the Democratic party, the Republican party, and
independence.
Keith et al. [1977, 1985], however, have pointed out that
independent-leaners, who comprise a majority of the independent cate
gory, behave much more like weak partisans than like pure independents
in presidential and congressional elections and resemble weak partisans
more than pure independents on measures of civic virtue. Consequently,
they argue, voting studies should aggregate leaners with partisans
rather than with pure independents, if the seven-point scale that
differentiates the three groups of independents is not employed.
Wekkin [1988] complements Keith et al. by demonstrating that the
voting behavior of independent-leaners even approximates that of weak
partisans during primary elections, both in terms of party-ballot selection
(in “ open” primaries) and candidate preference. He, too, argues, that
independent-leaners should be classified with partisans rather than with
pure independents when conceptualizing and measuring “ crossover vot
ing.”
Shively [1980], on the other hand, questions whether
behavioral evidence or even the party thermometer evidence of
attachment used by Weisberg, Valentine and Van Wingen, and
Maggiotto and Piereson can be considered valid indicators of subjects’
identification with a party. Possibly the causal arrow is reversed. Short
term forces such as the intention or act of voting for a given party’s
candidates in most races (or in the most salient races) may cue
independent identifiers to respond that they “ lean” toward or “ feel
warmly” toward that party, when in fact the implied blurring of
psychological space is not present. Thus, what appears to be a
measurably distinct category may reduce to a tautology.
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Data and Methodology
That possibility is addressed in this short study by utilizing an
innovative technique to shed new light on the consistency and relative
intensity of the psychological orientation of independent-leaners. This
technique is derived from the findings of numerous studies (e.g.,
Jennings & Niemi [1966]; Elkins [1978]; Clarke et al. [1979]; Blake
[1982]; LeDuc et al. [1984]; Hadley [1985]; Maggiotto & Wekkin [1987];
Niemi et al. [1987]) of Canadian and American partisanship that for a
significant share of the electorate in federal systems, partisan orientations
are differentiated by level of government. The hypothesis tested here is
that if independent-leaners’ partisan inclinations are in fact cued
reflections of their voting intentions, then these inclinations should alter
considerably as the federal context in which partisan identification is
assessed changes. In a Southern state such as Arkansas, for example,
where voters are notorious ticket-splitters1 who often support Republi
cans in presidential contests, Democrats in courthouse and legislative
contests, and may swing either way in given congressional and
gubernatorial elections, one might expect independent-leaners to
exhibit considerable volatility in their professed orientations as the
governmental context of those orientations changes from national to
state to local politics.
This hypothesis was tested twice during the course of a broader
study of multiple partisanship in Arkansas’ Second Congressional
District,
where
fairly
intense
two-party competition
has
characterized presidential and some congressional contests during the
1980s, while state and local elections—with the exception of the 1980
gubernatorial contest—have continued to be dominated by Democrats. In
the first empirical test, we asked 402 systematically-selected participants
in a 4 November 1986 exit-poll to respond to three national, state, and
local-oriented variations of the partisan identification question,2
separated in each instance by the standard contingency questions to
probe the strength of partisan attachment and the direction in which
independents leaned, if any. Then, in order to have additional measures
for contrast, we also employed standard, open-ended questions that asked
what the respondents liked and disliked about each of the political
parties.3 Voters were interviewed immediately after leaving the polls at
17 precincts located throughout the second congressional district, a
mixed urban/rural area that includes most of the Greater Little Rock
SMSA. This was the third such poll to sample these precincts, which had
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been randomly selected in 1982 from a universe of 448 precincts in the
eight counties that comprise the district. The sample results were
representative (i.e., within sampling error) of the universe with respect
to electoral outcomes in all races for office. Also, despite the tendency of
voters to overrepresent the middle and higher strata of society, the sample
was quite representative demographically, as well.4
In the second test, which took the form of an exit-poll
conducted during the 1988 presidential primary held on “ Super
Tuesday,” we asked 573 systematically-selected participants in the
same precincts (plus two) to respond to the same three federallydifferentiated partisan identification questions, augmented this time by
a thermometer test to provide additional information about the partisan
affect of the various categories of respondents. Again, the sample results
were within sampling error with respect to electoral outcomes in all races
for office.
Findings
The data in Table 1 do not suggest that independent-leaners are
especially fickle or tenuous in their commitment to their professed
orientation. In fact, Democratic-leaners and Republican-leaners are
less likely to change their political orientation (as one governmental
context is substituted for another) than two, usually three of the four
partisan categories are. In every case except the Democratic-leaning
independents in panel A, independent-leaners are extremely consistent in
their stated attachments, whether measured as a percentage of the
category or in comparison with other categories.
Only pure
independents and strong Democrats (whose consistency is buoyed by the
Southern tradition of yellow-dog loyalty” ) exceed the two sets of
independent-leaners in consistency of identification. Three-way crosstabulation shows that 62 percent of those who claimed to be independent-lcaners at any of the three levels of the federal system were stalwart
independent-leaners at all three levels. This, in a sample in which 26
percent of all respondents were found to be multiple partisans (i.e.,
professed different party identifications as state and/or local political
contexts were substituted for the national), is a fairly impressive rate of
consistency.
The consistency of identification found in the 1986 sample gave
way somewhat when the second district was resampled during the Spring,
1988 primary. Under ballot-rcstrictions that one might expect would
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possibly enhance the consistency of identification, if Shively is correct
about the influence of leaners’ votes upon their professions of identity,
respondents to the 1988 exit-poll actually tended to be less, not more,
consistent in partisan orientation. Three-way cross-tabulation revealed
that only about 30 percent of those who professed to be an independentleaner at some level were stalwart independent-leaners at all three
levels. But then 33 percent of the respondents to the sample were
multiple identifiers, and, as Table 2 shows, consistency of identification
dropped so much in every category of the seven-point scale that Democratic-leaners, at least, continued to rank ahead of two of the four
partisan groups.
Given Arkansans’ reputation for ticket-splitting, not to mention
the psychological pull that the state’s modified one-party Democratic
culture must exert on independents, one should expect to find many
multiple identifiers in the independent-leaner categories if Shively’s
hunch that the orientation follows the vote is correct. But one does not
find many in the 1986 sample, and the rate of inconsistency or multiple
identity among independent-leaners in the 1988 sample is lower or
proximate to that among weak and strong Republicans in panels A and B
of Table 2. The central hypothesis of this study thus earns little
support, in these two samples, at least.
Nor does the frequently much higher still rate of stalwartness
among pure independents in Table 1 and 2 suggest that this category
and those of the independent-leaners are separated by nothing more
than their respective voting intentions, or the relative amount of
introspection involved in their respective questionnaire responses.
Despite their consistency of orientation relative to several of the
partisan categories, it remains that independent-leaners are still less
likely than pure independents to identify themselves consistently as inde
pendents in all political contexts. The differences between independent-leaners and pure independents thus appear to be at least partly
differences of psychological space, and not merely a matter of responses
to short-term cues.
Open-Ended & Thermometer Evidence
Whether such differences should be attributed to
psychological space or to short-term influences may be further tested by
examining the open-ended evidence collected in the 1986 sample, and the
party-thermometer evidence collected in the 1988 sample. Analysis of
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the former tends to reinforce the above evidence and, in so doing, the
Keith et al. [1985] position regarding the placement of leaners with
partisans in both theory and measurement. The percentage of 1986
respondents who answered open-ended questions regarding what they
liked and disliked about the respective parties was 47 percent, which
compares favorably to that in national samples and provides a large
enough (N=189) and demographically similar enough sample6 to
permit nonparametric testing of intratabular differences between
independent-leaners and other types of identifiers.
As Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate, Democratic-leaning
independents and Republican-leaning independents generally share the
same levels of positive affect as partisan identifiers toward their preferred
parties. Leaners are much more likely than pure independents, opposite leaners, and opposite-partisans to make positive comments about their
preferred party, and negative comments about the opposing party.
Indeed, in 14 of the 24 possible cases in which the attitudes of the
appropriate set of independent-leaners are contrasted to those of the
other two categories of independents, the differences discovered are great
enough to be significant at the .05 level. Clearly, independent-leaners of
both types resemble partisans much more than they resemble their fellow
independents; so much so, in fact, that the old problem of intransitivity
rears its head in several places. Republican-leaning independents at every
level of the polity were considerably more likely than Republican identi
fiers to condemn the Democratic party, and were also slightly more
likely than state and local Republican identifiers to make favorable
comments about the Republican party. Democratic-leaners, in contrast,
exceeded Democratic partisans only once at making favorable
comments about their favored party or negative comments about the
disfavored party, but in any case resembled those partisans more closely
in affect than they resembled their fellow independents.
It also is apparent in these tables that pure independents stand
apart from independent-leaners in their propensity to make negative
comments about both political parties. Whereas Republican-leaners at
every level and Democratic-leaners at the national level tend to evaluate
their respective preferred parties more favorably than negatively (state
and local Democratic-leaners evince balanced views of their preferred
party), pure independents at each level evaluate both parties negatively,
usually by margins that match or exceed those of opposing partisan
identifiers. The mean percentage of negative comments made about
political parties by pure independents is 88 percent with respect to the
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Democratic party and 64 percent with respect to the Republican party,
compared to means of 39 and 37 percent making comments favorable to
the Democrats and Republicans, respectively. Computations not shown
in the tables reveal that 41 percent of the respondents who designated
themselves to be pure independents at one or more levels of the polity
made only negative comments about one or both political parties (three
out of four of these made strictly negative comments about both
parties), while another 29 percent made at best balanced comments (i.e.,
evenly distributed favorable/unfavorable responses) about the parties.
Interpretation of such clear predilections on the part of each
category should be qualified, of course, to the extent that many of these
189 respondents made mixed comments stating likes and dislikes about
one or both political parties. It is possible to take such multidimensional
responses into account by assigning values to each type of comment
made and creating a crude partisan-affect index score for each category
of respondents. We have assigned respondents one point for a positive
remark about the party they identify with or lean toward, one point for
a remark unfavorable to the opposing party, and have deducted
respondents one point for a remark unfavorable to their own party and for
a remark favorable to the opposing party. Thus, the maximum partisan
score a respondent might receive is +2, a score of 0 would indicate
offsetting remarks, and -2 represents the maximum in disaffection
toward one’s party. Employing this scale, Democratic and Republican
identifiers who volunteered responses to the open-ended questions
achieved index scores of 0.89 and 1.31, respectively, compared to index
scores of 0.46 and 1.37 for Democratic-leaners and Republican-leaners,
respectively. Once again, intransitivity is found to occur at the juncture
of Republican-leaners
and Republican
identifiers,
whereas
Democratic-leaners prove much less enthusiastic partisans than are
Democratic/ identifiers.
Although pure independents who disclaim attachment to either
party cannot be predicted to register favorable or unfavorable comments
toward either party, we nevertheless may compare their scores to those of
both sets of partisans and independent-leaners by arbitrarily treating them
as a category expected to favor the Democrats, and then repeating the
procedure in the expectation they would favor the Republicans. Follow
ing this procedure, pure independents registered an index score of -0.27
toward the Democratic party, and +0.27 toward the Republican party.
Thus, once again, independents prove much less favorable than
independent-leaners in affect toward the parties, but markedly less
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hostile toward the Republicans than toward the Democrats, who, as the
dominant party in the state, are perhaps the obvious referent for anti
partisan sentiment.
Finally, analysis of the specific content of these open-ended
responses uncovers little support for Shively’s thesis that independentleaners respond as they do because of the quality of candidates or other
short-term considerations. Of those 32 independent-leaners who troub
led to explain what they liked about the party they tilted toward, 41 percent
cited party policies, 25 percent cited party beliefs/ideologies, 13 percent
cited the party’s candidates, 9 percent cited the party’s group
affiliations, and another 13 percent cited general reasons. When asked
what they specifically disliked about the party they tilted away from, 48
percent of the 30 independent-leaners who responded cited the party’s
policies, 19 percent cited its ideology, 11 percent cited its candidates,
and a similar percentage cited its group affiliations and general
reasons, respectively. Although these particular data are questionable at
best because of diminutive sample size and because of the selectivity
that is a concomitant of open-ended items (i.e., those virtuous enough
to answer are probably more inclined to view politics in ideological or
policy-conscious terms), they are nevertheless consistent with the
preceding indicators that suggest that independent-leaners tilt toward
parties for dispositional reasons, not as a byproduct of their evaluation of
short-term considerations.
Thermometer Evidence
This is suggested still further by the thermometer evidence
gathered during the 1988 Super Tuesday sample. Table 5 shows that
consistent or “ global” independent-leaners’ thermometric evaluations
of the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively, tend more
toward those of the consistent partisans than toward those of consistent
pure independents, and that this closeness is, once again, accentuated by
intransitivity in the partisan scale at the juncture of independent-leaners
and weak partisans. Consistent leaners’ evaluations of political inde
pendents, on the other hand, tend to be closer to those of the consistent
pure independents than to those of the consistent partisans—so much so,
in fact, that Democratic-leaners even rate independents much more fa
vorably than the pure independent respondents do.
Moreover, each of these tendencies holds up, albeit in
somewhat weaker manner, upon inspection of the thermometric eval
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uations given by all self-identified independent-leaners, whether they
consistently identify themselves as such or not (see Table 6). Conse
quently, the thermometer data confirm but also amend the open-ended
data in that the independent-leaners in this sample appear to qualify as
partisans, not independents, in terms of affect toward the favored and
disfavored parties, respectively, while also categorizeable as independ
ents, not partisans, in terms of their feelings toward their fellow
independents.
Conclusions
What shall we make of the latter finding, or of this study’s
principal finding that independent-leaners are more consistent than
several partisan categories, but less consistent than pure independents, in
political orientation toward the three levels of government? Both find
ings suggest the centrality of partisan feeling as well as that of
independence in the cognitive structure of independent-leaners. On the
one hand, unlike pure independents, who registered neutral thermometric
evaluations and usually volunteered negative open-ended evaluations of
one or both political parties, the independent-leaners in these samples
clearly evince positive psychological ties toward one party and negative
feelings toward the other party according to both measures. On the
other hand, unlike partisan indentifiers, these same independent-leaners
also registered relatively favorable thermometric evaluations of inde
pendent identifiers. Given these tendencies, and the comparative
persistence
with
which independent-leaners stuck by their self
categorization besides, one would have to conclude that if Shively’s
thesis is correct, then it would have to be as true of those in the other
categories of the partisan identification scale as it is of independentleaners.
The sensible conclusion would appear to be that it is as
inappropriate to dismiss independent-leaners as basically incognizant
“ pure” independents as it is for Keith et al. [1985] and Wekkin [1988]
to recommend the expedient of lumping independent-leaners together
with partisans or weak partisans whenever one uses the three-point or
five-point partisan scales. The thrust of this study is that independentleaners are so distinct from both partisans and fellow independents that
the seven-point partisan scale should never be collapsed when
analyzing partisanship. Nor should one conceptualize independence,
as the revisionists are wont to do, as a political orientation so different
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from partisanship that it should not even be included in partisan scales.
Clearly, the two sets of independent-leaners qualify effectively for
inclusion in such scales, even if pure independents arguably do not. At
the same time, however, the standard view of partisanship as a scale
arranged along a single-dimensional continuum does not conduce a
sufficiently subtle understanding of the various blends of partisan and
independent shades that were found to characterize the independentleaners in this study. Ultimately, the data presented here may
reconcile best with Weisberg’s [1980] multidimensional conceptualiza
tion, which models partisanship as a cube constructed of separate, but
connected planes representing the respondent’s simultaneous orientations
toward the Democrats, the Republicans, and Independents, respectively.
But that is a question for more elaborate study.

Notes
1In 1968, for example, Arkansas voters shocked political analysts by electing
J.W. Fulbright, a Democrat, to the U.S. Senate, Winthrop Rockefeller, a Republican,
as governor, and George W allace’s American Independent Party slate to the
Electoral College. More recently, during the 1980 elections Arkansans elected
Republicans in the presidential, gubernatorial and two of four congressional contests,
while Democrats won all but seven legislative seats, two county judgeships, one
county sheriff’s office, and a dozen or so quorum court (county board) seats in a state of
75 counties.
2Wording of the partisan identification-items was as follows:
*Thinking now only of national politics, do you usually consider yourself to be
a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what? . . . (contingencies).
*Thinking now only of state politics here in Arkansas, do you usually consider
yourself to be a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what? . . . (contingencies).
*Thinking now only of local politics here in your community, do you usually
consider yourself to be a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what? . . . (contin
gencies).
3Question-items read: “ What do you like and/or dislike about the Democratic
party? . . . .What do you like and/or dislike about the Republican party?” Several lines
of space clearly marked “ Like” and “ Dislike” followed both items.
4For example, 86 percent of the sample respondents were white, whereas
census data show 83 percent of the population of the Second District (and of Arkansas)
to be white; 53 percent of the respondents were males, compared to census figures of
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48 percent for both the district and the state; the median years of education completed
by respondents was 13.2 compared to census figures of 12.4 for the district and 12.2
for the state; the median family income of respondents was $22,030, compared to
census figures of $22,700 for the district and $19,114 for the state; and the median
age of the respondents was 39 years, compared to census figures of 29 for the district
and 31 for the state. The 1988 sample was even closer to updated census data for
gender and median years of education, within sampling error for median age and racial
distribution, and slightly outside sampling error for family income.
5For the question-wording and introduction used in this test, see the note at the
bottom of Table 5.
6For example, 89 percent of those who responded to the open-ended questions
were white, compared to 86 percent of the total sample; 23 percent were occupied in
professional-technical fields, compared to 19 percent of the total sample; 16 percent
were liberals, compared to 17 percent of the total sample; 5 percent lacked a high
school diploma, compared to 9 percent of the sample, etc.
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Table 1
Consistency of Partisan Identification
as Federal Context Changes, 1986

Panel A: Percentage Whose Party ID Remains Constant When Context Shifts
from National to State Politics

Str.
Dem.
Percentage
of Consistent
Identifiers
N=

Weak
Dem.

97.1% 89.6%
104
77

Ind.
Lean
Dem.

Pure
Ind.

Ind.
Lean
Rep.

67.6%
37

92.7%
55

82.4% 55.8%
34
43

Weak
Rep.

Str.
Rep.

77.1%
35

Panel B: Percentage Whose Party ID Remains Constant When Context Shifts
from National to Local Politics

Str.
Dem.

Weak
Dem.

Ind.
Lean
Dem.

Percentage
of Consistent
Identifiers

92.3%

80.0%

83.3%

90.7%

94.1%

40.5%

51.4%

N=

104

75

36

54

34

42

35

Pure
Ind.

Ind.
Lean
Rep.

Weak
Rep.

Str.
Rep.

Panel C: Percentage Whose Party ID Remains Constant When Context Shifts
from State to Local Politics

Str.
Dem.

Weak
Dem.

Ind.
Lean
Dem.

Pure
Ind.

Ind.
Lean
Rep.

Weak
Rep.

63.6% 59.1%

Percentage
of Consistent
Identifiers

89.5% 77.3%

83.7%

98.3%

92.3%

N=

105

33

58

26

85

12

43

Str.
Rep.

22
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Table 2
Consistency of Partisan Identification
as Federal Context Changes, 1988
Panel A: Percentage Whose Party ID Remains Constant When Context Shifts
from National to State Politics
Str.
Dem.

Ind.
Weak Lean
Dem. Dem.

Pure
Ind.

Ind.
Lean
Rep.

Weak Str.
Rep. Rep.

Percentage
of Consistent
Identifiers

93.5% 64.9% 55.3% 63.6% 32.6% 45.5% 47.2%

N=

139

111

38

33

46

77

106

Panel B: Percentage Whose Party ID Remains Constant When Context Shifts
from National to Local Politics

Percentage
of Consistent
Indentifiers
N=

Str.
Dem.

Ind.
Weak Lean
Dem. Dem.

Pure
Ind.

Ind.
Lean
Rep.

Weak Str.
Rep. Rep.

82.6% 57.7% 48.6% 88.6% 26.7% 43.4% 43.1%
138

111

37

35

45

76

102

Panel C: Percentage Whose Party ID Remains Constant When Context Shifts
from State to Local Politics
Str.
Dem.

Ind.
Weak Lean
Dem. Dem.

Pure
Ind.

Ind.
Lean
Rep.

Weak Str.
Rep. Rep.

Percentage
of Consistent
Identifiers

78.5% 60.5% 47.8% 81.6% 39.4% 74.1% 65.1%

N=

172

129

46

49

13

33

54

63
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Table 3
Percentage of Respondents Making Favorable and Unfavorable
Comments About the Democratic Party

Panel A: Partisan Identification With Respect to National Politics

Pure
Ind.

Ind.
Lean
Rep.

Rep.

78%

32%

33%

36%

41%

61%

77%

100%

86%

91

18

22

21

36

Dem.

Ind.
Lean
Dem.

Favorable

68%

Unfavorable
N=

Panel B: Partisan Identification With Respect to State Politics

Pure
Ind.

Ind.
Lean
Rep.

Rep.

50%

42%

40%

22%

41%

56%

92%

100%

85%

97

16

24

20

27

Dem.

Ind.
Lean
Dem.

Favorable

74%

Unfavorable
N=

Panel C: Partisan Identification With Respect to Local Politics

Dem.

Ind.
Lean
Dem.

Pure
Ind.

Ind.
Lean
Rep.

Rep.

Favorable

72%

69%

50%

21%

15%

Unfavorable

41%

69%

92%

100%

77%

N=

95

13

38

19

13

14
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Table 4
Percentage of Respondents Making Favorable and Unfavorable
Comments about the Republican Party

Panel A: Partisan Identification With Respect to National Politics
Pure
Ind.

Ind.
Lean
Rep.

Rep.

17%

36%

86%

92%

81%

50%

64%

43%

42%

91

18

22

21

36

Dem.

Ind.
Lean
Dem.

Favorable

12%

Unfavorable
N=

Panel B: Partisan Identification With Respect to State Politics

Dem.

Ind.
Lean
Dem.

Favorable

22%

Unfavorable
N=

Pure
Ind.

Ind.
Lean
Rep.

Rep.

19%

29%

95%

85%

76%

56%

71%

55%

37%

97

16

24

20

27

Panel C: Partisan Identification With Respect to Local Politics

Dem.

Ind.
Lean
Dem.

Favorable

21%

Unfavorable
N=

Pure
Ind.

Ind.
Lean
Rep.

Rep.

23%

50%

95%

92%

81%

62%

61%

42%

23%

95

13

38

19

13

15
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Table 5

Consistent (Non-Multiple) Identifiers’ Affective Responses to the Parties
As M easured by Feelings T herm om eter, 1988*

Str.
Dem.

Ind.
Weak Lean
Dem. Dem.

Mean Thermometric
Evaluation of
Democratic party

83°

63°

Mean Thermometric
Evaluation of
Independents

27°

Mean Thermometric
Evaluation of
Republican Party
N=

Pure
Ind.

Ind.
Lean
Rep.

Weak Str.
Rep. Rep.

59°

45°

34°

41°

22°

31°

70°

50°

49°

42°

34°

25°

45°

33°

53°

65°

75°

91°

108

52

13

17

8

28

38

*Questions were prefaced and asked in the following manner: “ Below is a
'political thermometer’ to test your feelings about certain people and groups.

Its temperature range runs from 100 degrees, which means you have very warm
feelings toward a person or group, to 0 degrees, which means you feel very cool
toward a person or group. A temperature of about 50 degrees would mean you
have neutral feelings toward a person or group . . . (thermometer pictured)
Where would you place your feelings toward the Republican party on this
thermometer?__________ degrees
Where would place your feelings toward the Democratic
thermometer? _____________degrees

party

on this

W here would you place your feelings toward Independents on this thermome
ter? _______ _ degrees.”
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Table 6
Affective Responses to the Parties of All Identifiers (Consistent and
Inconsistent Combined) As Measured by Feelings Therm ometer, 1988*

Pure
Ind.

Ind.
Lean
Rep.

Weak Str.
Rep. Rep.

56°

43°

34°

38°

25°

35°

51°

45°

44°

33°

34°

28°

49°

43°

61°

72°

78°

88°

154

95

30

48

33

53

63

Str.
Dem.

Ind.
Weak Lean
Dem. Dem.

Mean Thermometric
Evaluation of
Democratic Party

79°

60°

Mean Thermometric
Evaluation of
Independents

28°

Mean Thermometric
Evaluation of
Republican Party
N=

*Questions worded as in Table 5.
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